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The aim of this work is to forecast the aggregate expenditure on medicines at the hospital level 
under the National Health Service (NHS) and thereby, compute the risk (expenditure on medicine 
consumption to the hospital) through a Value at Risk (VaR) analysis.  The expenditure on medicines 
at the hospital level has been forecasted, by using the data available about the public hospitals 
under the NHS to get estimates of the variance in the expenditure on medicines used by hospitals. 
From the results obtained for the risk involved in the public hospitals under the NHS, an insight to 
the 1st wave hospitals under Public Private Partnerships has been provided in order to tackle the 
technological risk on medicine consumption. We call this expenditure on consumption of medicines 
as drugs risk. 
An ordinary least square regression has been used to forecast the expenditure on medicines in the 
hospitals under the NHS. For the purpose of forecasting, three models have been tested. The 
residuals then obtained from the regressions have been used to compute risk through VaR analysis. 
This work concludes that public hospitals, regarding drug risks, do not suffer from very high VaR. To 
what extent do the hospitals under the 1st wave Public Private Partnerships model suffer from 
technological risk is still a question to answer, to compute the risk for such hospitals more 
information about the medicine consumption is necessary. 
As the hospitals under Public Private Partnerships in Portugal are very recent, no information or data 
about such hospitals is available. Only data for the public hospitals under the NHS are available, 
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HM Treasury (2000) defines Public private Partnerships (PPP’s) as an arrangement that brings public 
and private sectors together to deliver significantly improved public services, by contributing to 
increases in the quality and quantity of investment. 
The legal instrument underpinning the partnerships most often used in Portugal is the concession of 
public service, involving, in most cases, the design, financing, construction, maintenance and 
operation of infrastructure designed to meet the public need in question, being in the sectors of 
infrastructure for road transport and the uptake and distribution of water and waste treatment 
where there is a significant part of the contracts already concluded. Besides these two sectors, PPP’s 
tender were also launched in the health sector (DGTF, 2008). 
As has been described later, the clinical services in the Portuguese PPP/health model under the 1st 
wave are managed by the private sector. Keeping this into consideration, the work tends to identify 
the technological risk on drugs in the hospitals under PPP. Technology has vast meanings, but here 
technological risk which is measured through Value at Risk (VaR) is meant to capture the impact of 
the aggregate cost of medicine consumption which may include any new introduction of drugs, on 
the costs borne by the concessionaire providing the clinical services. 
The question that also arises is, whether the risk and uncertainty involved in innovation of medical 
technologies should be borne by the private sector (the concessionaire), the public sector or should 
they be shared between the two? Who should bear the technological risk under the 1st wave 
PPP/health Portuguese model?  
Ideally, in order to measure the technological risk, information about the number of new drugs that 
are introduced each year should be studied, estimating how much they add to the expenditure of 
hospitals and the variance of these costs over the years. Due to the unavailability of information it 
was not possible to capture the effect of a group of new drugs on the expenditure on medicines by 
the hospitals. Hence, the aim of this work is to forecast the expenditure on medicines at the hospital 
level using the data available publicly to get estimates of variance in the expenditure on medicines 
by hospitals and then provide an insight to the 1st wave PPP hospitals about the technological risk 
involved. 
From the results it was found that, considering a 95% confidence level, and the standard deviation 
estimate, it can be said that 5% of the times, the hospitals loses within the next month, next three 
months or within the next year, at least 5.0409%, 5.0498% & 4.9785% respectively in January 2012.
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1.1 Literature Review 
Public private partnerships in the health sector have gained attention for some time now due to the 
two following reasons. Firstly, technological innovation and modernization in the health sector 
makes it susceptible to financial un-sustainability. Health technologies are all means (material or 
otherwise) and procedures for the prevention, diagnosis, treatment and rehabilitation of diseases 
and their consequences. In this sense, health technologies are articulated sets of health care (PNS 
2011-2016). Secondly, the health sector faces demographic pressure which implies higher costs of 
health of the aging population and lower amounts associated with tax payments.  
The health sector is subject to a lot of risk and uncertainty due to innovation in health, particularly in 
the field of medicine. Long-term planning is difficult in the health service because healthcare is 
changing over time and the local demography may also change. This may affect the optimum type 
and location of facilities that are required. This exposes the Trust to the risk that it may become 
locked into a long-term contract for buildings and services that are no longer needed. This issue is 
not limited to PPP hospitals, but the long-term service contract of a PPP deal makes termination 
likely to be more expensive (NAO, 2002).  
New technologies like improvements in drugs come with at an expense and involve indirect costs 
like the cost of training and promotion. For a given technology to be adopted, it has to prove not 
only its relative effectiveness as the most-reasonable (at least) of the budgetary outlay for additional 
funding from its use. When this is done, we reach the ultimate goal of technology assessment - the 
hierarchy in terms of cost-effectiveness. In addition, funding agencies also ask for an evaluation of 
the overall impact of the financing of new technology on your budget. The model underlying this 
exercise is that proposes to choose the most cost-effective technology for each indication, i.e., that 
will maximize the given health care budget restrictions, not the least expensive but more efficient, 
i.e., which has lower costs per unit results (PNS 2011-2016).  
There are two kinds of risks/uncertainties borne by the public sector under the PPP contract. First, 
there are those that remind the Trust of its obligations in relation to specific details of the contract - 
vis, use of the hospital complex. Second, they provide a further reminder of the wider uncertainties 
that fall upon the hospital management in relation to clinical and legislated NHS organizational 
changes. These are highlighted in the PPP contract to make absolutely clear that it is the Trust, not 
the private sector partner, who bears the full responsibilities for these potential uncertainties 
(Broadbent, Gill, Laughlin, 2008) 
In the U.K, under the PPP it is made very clear that the uncertainty involved with unexpected 
changes in medical technology is borne by the public sector whereas in Portugal under the 1st wave 
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model there is no evidence about who bears the cost of such uncertainties but with the kind of 
pressure from the government, usually the private sector has to bear it. Although PPP’s and project 
finance are of great importance for public policy and have recently gained public eye in Portugal, no 
quantitative models have been developed to measure the technological risk for PPP in the health 
sector.  
Despite the relevance of the project finance market, so far a formal model to measure the potential 
losses for lenders supporting project finance deals has not been formally developed. They suggest 
how VaR for project finance deals may be measured through Monte Carlo simulation, by discussing 
how default risk could be defined and a loss distribution could be derived (Gatti, Rigamonti, Saita, 
Senati, 2007).  
Every PPP project is subject to an investment appraisal to check its economic prospects and also 
whether it reflects a value for money. For this reason, (Savvides, 1994) present the methodology and 
use of Monte Carlo simulation to analyze and evaluate risk of investment projects such as PPP. He 
concludes that an in depth risk analysis of the project is useful in order to take the correct 
investment decision. In this way investment opportunities are identified, projects areas that require 
further investigation are identified and enhance a better risk allocation and management between 
the parties involved. 
More emphasis needs to be placed on strategies for the transfer of risk for the successful conclusion 
of PPP contracts (Nisar, 2007). To do so, he adopted a case study research to examine the effects of 
risk transfer on value for money gains of five PPP projects. He concluded that the PPP arrangement 
is about delivering better services by combining the strengths of the public and private sectors 
working in partnership, each focusing on the areas it does best. Recognizing the limitations of using a 
case study approach he also concluded that the approach underlines the role of risk allocation in PPP 
projects—the party that can manage the risk at the lowest cost should be responsible for it. 
The effective introduction of new medicines in the domestic market depends on three elements 
(Pedro, Luis 2011): 
 1) Before the medicines may be introduced in the market, they need to satisfy the criterias 
of safety, efficacy and quality. After satisfying  those criteria’s, the market receives the Authorisation 
of Introduction of Medicines. This barrier is usually defined at the European Union level. 
 2) The second barrier exists at the national level, where the decision of the reimbursement 
of the medicines by the NHS has to conform to the existing methodological guidelines, economic 
evaluation and an evaluation by Infarmed. 
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 3) The decision to introduce a new medicine in the Portuguese market depends completely 
on the marketing of the pharmaceutical company.   
The economic evaluation of health technologies: Canada provides guidelines (2006) for the analysts 
to carry out an economic evaluation for decision-making relevant for the Canadian health care 
system. Such guidelines apply to a variety of health technologies, including those that promote 
health, prevent and treat conditions, or improve rehabilitation and long-term care. The Canadian 
guidelines for the economic evaluation of health technologies set forward evaluations such as the 
use of a cost-utility analysis (CUA), cost-effectiveness analysis when (CUA) is an inappropriate choice, 
a cost-minimization analysis (CMA), a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) using sensitivity analysis, but 
generally, it should be considered as a secondary analysis or a cost-consequence analysis (CCA). 
Provided that methodologies for incorporating uncertainty into health technology evaluation are not 
yet well developed, an approach to evaluating health technologies based on the ideas of real options 
has been put forward. These seek to integrate the uncertainty and irreversibility associated with a 
technology into a unifying theory of economic evaluation, which offers the decision-maker a 
systematic framework for handling the degree of uncertainty inherent in evidence on the cost-
effectiveness of a health technology. The mathematical form of this process can be written as:  d x = 
α dt + sigma d z. In the simplest form of a Poisson process, a random variable can take only two 
values and has a fixed probability in each time period of changing from one to the other. This 
process is used to model situations in which the variable of interest is subject to rare but critical 
‘jumps’. In health care, it might for example be used to model the emergence of a new drug which 
constitutes a discrete shock to the associated market (Palmer, Smith 2000). 
The agreement in February, 2006 between the health ministry and the Portuguese Association of 
Pharmaceutical Industry –APIFARMA, it was intended to limit the growth of expenditure on drugs. 
The agreement established ceilings to the growth of drugs spending, with the return of funds to the 
health ministry when the ceiling was exceeded. In March 2007, new regulation for the fixation of 
prices of the medicines were established by international referencing and the prices discontinued to 
be fixed price and passed on to be maximum prices. The new agreement in 2011, provides ceilings to 
the pharmaceutical expenditure borne by the NHS but without a ceiling or growth rate specified for 
the total expenditure. This feature allows to anticipate a shift to consumption of drugs with lower 
reimbursements of NHS, that conciles the objectives of growth of activity of pharmaceutical industry 
with the objective of cost containment of expenditure of NHS with drugs at the expense of a greater 
financial effort of the citizens (Pedro, Luis 2011).  
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The measures adopted by Portugal with the objective of cost containment mainly in medicines by 
reducing the process has an indirect cost of potencially delaying the introduction of new medicines 
in the national market. The existence of low prices in Portugal, from the point of view of the 
pharmaceutical companies, has created an each a higher temporal gap in the introduction of 
innovative medicines in the Portugues market, which increases in the approval time until the 
decision of reimbursement by NHS. Infarmed does not make available information about 
reimbursements and the time spent in evaluation each request (new medicine). The delay in the 
decisions of the pharmaceutical companies in introducing new medicines in the various countries 
has more to do with the price regulation than the authorization process. Portugal registers delay 
higher than 4 years in many products. For Portugal the average time for the introduction of a new 
medicine was of 14.2 months. The main alteration in the last decade was the introduction of an 
economic barrier in the utilization of new medicines at the hospital level (Pedro, Luis 2011). 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of PPP’s in general and particularly 
in the health sector in Portugal. Section 3 puts forward the data and methodology for measuring the 













2. PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
(World Bank, 2007) defines a PPP broadly as an agreement between a government and a private 
firm under which the private firm delivers an asset, a service, or both, in return for payments 
contingent to some extent on the long-term quality or other characteristics of outputs delivered.  
PPP models are used for the development of investment projects of public interest. They attract 
private capital for the financing of expenditure of public investment and also benefit from the 
technical capacity and specialization of private entities in the construction and in the management 
of services, in a context of sharing the associated risk. Such investments that are reversed back to 
the government are coined as concession, although during the contract term, the building remains 
with the concessionaire (DGTF, 2008). 
The role of PPP’s has become significant ever since the government considered the involvement of 
the private sector in the delivery of public services. What led the government to such a 
consideration was the failure in complying by the budget constraints and inefficiency in the 
completion of the projects built by the public sector on time. Therefore to satisfy the quality and 
demand of investment in public services and to sustain development and economic growth and to 
make a better use of the taxpayer’s money, many countries including Portugal considered PPP as a 
way for the provision of public services. Through PPP’s, the government try to achieve value for 
money (VFM) which can be explained as providing the services in a much efficient and improved way 
by using the same amount of funds that the public sector would have used or spent to provide a 
similar service or project. Under PPP, VFM is achieved by transferring risk and sharing risk best 
managed by parties involved. Figure 1 below illustrates the value-for-money comparison between a 
public sector comparator (PSC) and a PPP bid. Assuming all things equal (i.e. quality and risk 
allocation), value for money is demonstrated when the total present value cost of private sector 
supply is less than the net present value of the base cost of the service, adjusted for: the cost of risks 
to be retained by the government; cost adjustments for transferable risks; and competitive 









U.K once a pioneer in PPP’s uses the private finance initiative to provide health services to the 
public. The National Audit Office (NAO, 1999) categorizes risk as design and construction risk, 
commissioning and operating risks, demand risk, residual value risk, technology/obsolescence risk, 
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Risk to be retained by 
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Figure 1: PSC and value for money (adapted from Grimsey, Lewis 2004) 
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2.1- PPP’s in the Health Sector 
2.1.1 - Overview of PPP/health models over the globe 
U.K once a pioneer in PPP uses the private finance initiative (PPP) to provide health services to the 
public. Under PPP/health, the private sector enterprise that will own and run the hospital is not an 
existing corporation but a new joint venture or consortium known as a Special Purpose Vehicle 
(SPV). The SPV typically includes construction, IT, medical supplies, domestic services and 
pharmaceutical corporations (Froud, Shaoul, 2001). The private sector under the PPP in U.K is 
responsible only for construction and maintenance of the hospital which is transferred back to the 
government at the end of contract term. The management of clinical services remains in the hands 
of the public sector. Therefore, the private sector has lower levels of risk.  
Australia uses a model similar to that of privatization in which the private sector is also responsible 
for the provision of the clinical services but the hospital is not transferred back to the government at 
the end of the contract term. Spain on the other hand uses a model in which the private sector is 
responsible for the provision of the clinical services and the infrastructure is transferred back to the 
government at the end of the contract term. 
2.1.2 - Overview of PPP/health in Portugal 
The Portuguese Health system is characterized by three coexisting systems: the NHS, special social 
health insurance schemes for certain professions (health subsystems) and voluntary private health 
insurance.1 The NHS supports primary healthcare, basic and specialized hospital care and continued 
healthcare which provides universal coverage and free access for all citizen. The Portuguese 
healthcare system is based on the Public healthcare (NHS) created in 1979 and is financed by 
taxpayers. The NHS is complemented by an ambulatory medical system. 
Drugs in Portugal are authorized through the centralized authorization procedure or through 
national authorization procedures. In the case of national authorizations, the legal framework 
establishes that the authorization permits each of the national authorities in Portugal to INFARMED 
IP, so that the evaluation can be performed in a coordinated manner between different authorities 
or independently by each, according to the detail (PNS 2011-2016). 
Between 2008 and 2010 in Portugal; the amount of net expenditure with PPP has more than 
doubled, reaching 1,128 million Euros in 2010, representing a high future burden on public accounts. 
In percentage of GDP, these expenditures have evolved approximately from 0.3% in 2008 to 0.7% in 
                                                          
1 Health Portal 
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2010. It is worth noting that the value of 2010 represented an increase of approximately 19% 
compared to the predicted value. (DGTF, 2011) 
From the Figure 2 below, it can be seen that the investment in PPP is dominated by the road sector, 
followed by the railway sector, health sector and lastly by security. 
 
Figure 2 : Sectoral breakdown of total investment in PPP 
Source: DGTF, 2011 
 
In 2001, Portugal launched a PPP programme for the health sector for the construction and 
management of new hospitals, including clinical services which came to be known as the First Wave 
(1st wave). The PPP/health under the 1st wave involved two different bodies which integrated two 
different objectives. Firstly, the management of clinical services with a contract term of 10 years 
responsible for clinical services, ancillary services and medical equipment acquisition and 
replacement. Secondly, construction and management of the hospital infrastructure with a contract 
term of 30 years responsible for the design, construction and maintenance of the hospital building 
and fixed equipment. The hospitals under the 1st wave are: 
 Hospital of Loures 
 Hospital of Cascais 
 Hospital of Braga 
 Hospital of Vila Franca de Xira 





















Hospital of Braga 
(Groups: Mello, Edifer 
and Somague) 
Escala Braga, Gestora do 
Edifício S.A. 
Escala Braga, Gestora do 
Estabelecimento S.A 
124.4 M€ 2009 2011 
Hospital of Loures 
(Grupo Espírito Santo – 
Consis Loures grouping) 
HL Sociedade Gestora do 
Edifício S.A. 
SGHL Sociedade Gestora do 
Hospital de Loures S.A. 
86.3 M€ 2009 2012 
Hospital of Cascais TDHOSP - Gestão de 
Edifício Hospitalar, SA 
HPP Saúde - Parcerias 
Cascais, SA 
73 M€ 2008 2010 
Hospital of V.F.Xira 
(led by Mello Group) 
Escala Vila Franca - 
Gestora do Edifício, S.A 
Escala Vila Franca – 
Sociedade Gestora do 
Estabelecimento, S.A. 
76.3 M€ 2010 2013 
Table 1: Investment in construction & expropriation /original hospital equipment (adapted from dgtf, august 2011) 
Source: Direção-Geral dos Tesouro e Finanças 
 
There are two different payment mechanism of the PPP model for a hospital under the 1st wave 
which are described below and is also demonstrated in table 2:  
 Annual payment to the clinical SPV 
Here the payment mechanism is rigid. The private sector or the hospital receives the same amount 
of money for any kind of services provided as would be provided by the public sector. Quantity and 
price for product or service to be sold is negotiated annually. The only way to increase the unit price 
is through inflation to gain more money but its chances are very low due to the competitive pressure 
of the tender process. The other way to gain some extra revenue apart from what is fixed is through 
emergency visits of patients as here the demand is not under control. Other variable revenue could 
be through discharges, outpatient visits and hospital day sessions. The hospital can provide services 
to people outside its catchment area up to a maximum of 10%. For example, pregnant women have 
the right to choose the hospital for the delivery but due to the rigid contract details, if the contract 
does not include this clause, the hospital is not allowed to accept that pregnant woman. 
 Annual Payment to the infrastructural SPV 
Here the payment depends on the availability. But if the private sector fails to provide the quality 






In 2005, the 2nd wave of PPP’s for health came into effect which involved only one management 
body. Under it, the tender only covers the hospital infrastructure aspect assuming the same 
responsibility as in 1st wave. Clinical and healthcare provision management remains with the public 
sector. The 2nd wave includes 5 hospitals of substitution: 
 Hospital of Algarve    
 Hospital of Evora 
 Hospital of Guarda 
 Hospital of Povoa do Varzim/ Vila do Conde 
 Hospital of Vila Nova de Gaia 
 
The payment to the infrastructural SPV depends on the availability. Figure 3 below depicts the 
forecast of costs with PPP in the health system. 
 
Figure 3: Evolution of future expenditure in PPP’s the health sector in Portugal (in millions of Euros) 





Contract Objective Conception, construction, 
financing, exploration of the 
hospitals building 
Management of clinical services 
Contract Term 30 years 10 years 
Responsibility Management entity for 
infrastructure 
Management entity for clinical 
services 
Activity Conception, construction and 
maintenance of hospital building, 
hard facilities management and 
fixed heavy equipments. 
Management of hospital, clinical 
services, soft facilities management 
Payment mechanism Payment on availability Associated to clinical activity 
Table 2: Payment mechanism under the 1st wave model (adapted from Tribunal de Contas, 2009) 
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2.1.3 – Risk sharing structure 
The risk sharing structure for the health care services for each hospital under public private 
partnership as elaborated by (DGTF, 2011) has been described below. 
Hospital of Cascais  
The risk of providing health care services to residents outside the catchment area is retained in the 
sphere of the public contractor. Nevertheless, this risk is totally mitigated by imposing a limit of 10% 
of a predicted production to be provided outside the catchment area. If the effective production is 
much lower than predicted then this risk is shared, mitigating it partially by imposing deduction on 
remunerations due to the failure of performance and an obligation of presenting by the private 
concessionaire of construction of the building of a diagnostic and a corrective measure plan subject 
to the approval by the public contractor. In what concerns the financial risks, and from the point of 
view of the public contractor, inflation risk is of particular importance, which is retained by the 
public contractor, with respect to the evolution of the reference prices associated to health care 
services. 
Hospital of Braga, Loures & (Vila Xira de Franca) 
The improper transfer of risks of the users and the provision of health care services to residents 
outside the catchment area is retained in the sphere of the public contractor. Nevertheless, this risk 
is totally mitigated by imposing deduction on remunerations for improper transfers and by imposing 
a limit of 10% of a predicted production to be provided outside the catchment area. The transfer 
covers 80% (75%) of the total demand risk including namely; the ability to attract users of the 
catchment area, the guarantee that the installed capacity will meet the predicted production, the 
integration with the health centers of the catchment area of Hospital of Loures, access to health care 
services, articulation with the national network of integrated continued care. In what concerns the 
financial risks, and from the point of view of the public contractor, inflation risk is of particular 
importance, which is retained by the public contractor, with respect to the evolution of the 







2.1.4 - Criticisms of the 1st wave PPP/health model  
The 1st wave PPP model adopted by the then Portuguese government has raised many questions 
such as “who would be responsible for fixing the characteristics of the construction of the hospital, 
the government or the private sector due the difference in the contract term of the two 
management bodies involved in the provision of clinical services and infrastructure” (Tribunal de 
Contas, 2009). 
The (Tribunal de Contas, 2009) also criticizes the government’s decision of the 1st wave model on 
various other grounds which are as follows: 
 The government did not have experience in contracting PPP for Health. They used the traditional 
model for contracting PPP. PPP contracts were established without prior planning. 
 The government did not study the models used by other countries for PPP/Health. Many 
countries including United Kingdom that were in this field much before Portugal opted by not 
including the management of clinical services in the PPP contract.  
 The Health Ministry did not have experience in evaluating the competition process. 
 The decisions involved political motives and incentives, not giving priorities to healthcare 
required by the people of a particular catchment area. 
 PPP/health lacked a healthcare indicator although public health possessed a lot of experience.  
 The government signed many contracts at the same time, creating false expectations for the 
private sector making them spend unnecessary resources and bear excessive costs (in creating 
structures and in elaborating the proposals). 
 The projects that the government proposed required both financial and human resources higher 
than were actually needed. 
 The government lacked clarity in the definition of objectives, which left the private sector with a 
lot of doubts, which made it difficult for the private sector to oblige by the stipulated deadlines. 
 The complexity in the phases of the tender process obligated the government to analyze and 
evaluate a much more complex negotiation process which created negative repercussions in 
fulfilling the fixed terms. The performance of the phases involved a tender’s process is depicted 
in table 3 below.  
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 High level of bureaucracy was involved which delayed each level of the competition’s process. 2 
 
 
Preparation & Appraisal 
Objective Cascais Braga V.F Xira Loures 
 3 1 5 8 
Approval & Release 1 1 1 3 2 
Submission & Release 6 5 8 5 5 
Evaluation of Proposals 5 17 15 23 13 
Competitive Negotiation 5 6 13 4  
Final Negotiation 3 11 7   
Table 3: Expected vs. Actual duration of phases in the tender process (adapted from Tribunal de Contas, 2009) 
 
Another critic of the hospitals under the 1st wave is that each hospital is treated as a case and each 
case is negotiated separately. This implies the 4 projects under this model may solve the same 
problem differently. This indicates that the management is not homogenous. Different PPP contracts 
may have different characteristics. Hospital of Sintra has a very simple contract, they have a 
separate drugs account. Here the government pays for the extra drugs cost whereas at hospital of 
Loures, the hospital does not receive any extra payment for providing an innovation, not included in 
the original contract but made obligatory by the government. The cost of technology (innovation or 
improvement of drug) has to be treated as an internal cost (has to be included in the price). 
Contracts are rigid. The health ministry or the finance ministry can stop any innovation or provision 
of service by the hospital if that service is not mentioned explicitly in the contract. In order for the 
hospital to be able to provide that innovation or service a 4 or 5 pages long letter needs to be 
presented to ministry to modify the contract. Changes in common legislation has to be accepted by 
the hospital but changes in the specific legislation may not necessarily be accepted. 
 
                                                          
2 List of entities involved: 
 Ministers of Health and Finance (must approve all the major decisions); 
 Commissions responsible for the tender documents’ preparation (include members from the health and finance ministries); 
 Commissions responsible for bid valuation and negotiations (include members from the health and finance ministries); 
 Departments and entities of the Ministry of Finance (e.g.: Parpública, General Inspectorate of Finance);  
 Departments and entities from the Ministry of Health (e.g. Regional Health Administrations, Partnerships in Health, Central 
Health Systems Administration, public hospitals);  
 Teams of advisors and consultants;  




3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The analysis utilizes data from Infarmed – Autoridade Nacional do Medicamento e Produtos de 
Saude I.P about the consumption of medicines in hospitals. 
 In this section, the treatment of the raw database is presented along with some assumptions made 
to study the volatility of aggregate consumption of medicines by the hospitals under NHS in Portugal 
and thereby compute VaR. This involves 4 building blocks: data collection and its treatment, model 
development, volatility analysis and finally tabulating VaR. 
3.1 Data 
3.1.1 Infarmed I.P 
Since the creation if Ordinance No. 155/2007 of January 31, which states that from April 1, 2007, the 
hospitals and other institutions of the NHS must report compulsorily to INFARMED, on a monthly 
basis, information on consumption of medicines and hospital care movement. 
The data about consumption refers to products covering “Código Hospitalar Nacional de 
Medicamentos” (CHNM) - Hospital National Drug Code that encompasses medicines of human use 
with the “Authorisation of Introduction in Market” (AIM), “Autorização de Utilização Especial” (AUE) 
- Authorization of Special Use and an “Autorização de Utilização Excepcional” (AUE) - Authorization 
of Exceptional Use. It includes all the medicines dispensed with CHNM by hospitals, whatever the 
nature of funding. The data related to the consumption of medicines at the hospital level is a project 
in development, so that the data may be subject to changes arising from the validation of qualitative 
and quantitative information.3 
3.1.2 Data Collection  
The sample covers the monthly evolution of the consumption of medicines at the hospital level for 
the period between January 2007 and December 2011 of the public hospitals under NHS.  
The data that is presented in the monthly reports corresponds to only those hospitals that are able 
to send information about their consumption of medicines. Due to the inability to send information 
within the stipulated period of time, some hospitals may not be included in the reports of that 
month. Therefore the number of hospitals that report to Infarmed each month is different. Due to 
this reason only the reports of the month of December of each year has been used to collect the 
data of the monthly consumption of medicines at the hospital level which is illustrated in Table 4. 





Using the report of December of each year, the information about the monthly consumption of 
medicines, number of hospitals belonging to NHS that reported to Infarmed that month and the 
percentage of consumption of medicines those hospitals constituted to that month was used.   
Year 
(December of each year) 
No. of Hospitals that 
reported to Infarmed 
% of consumption of 
hospitals of NHS 
2007 68 87% 
2008 50 62% 
2009 50 70% 
2010 57 100% 
2011 57 100% 
Table 4: Hospitals contribution to Infarmed 
Information about the accumulated distribution of consumption of medicines is also available per 
hospital, per area of activity, per healthcare services, per therapeutic classification and per 20 most 
used active substance. Consumption of orphan medicines, medicines with AUE are also included in 
the monthly reports. But none of them have been used for the purpose of analysis. It is also 
necessary to note that none of the hospitals under PPP had reported to Infarmed during the period 
of 2007 -2011. 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Variables  
3.2.1.1 Dependent Variable 
Aggregate Consumption of medicines in time t –  
When a new drug is made available in the market, the NHS may or may adopt those medicines and 
make it obligatory for the hospitals to provide those new medicines. Once made obligatory, the 
hospitals necessarily have to provide those medicines when required by the patients of their 
catchment area. But the provision of this new drug may not necessarily be covered under the PPP 
contract initially signed upon. Taking into account the uncertainty involved at the hospital level in 
the introduction of a new drug (new technology), the initial objective of the work was to be able to 
capture the frequency with which new drugs are introduced in the market and eventually what 
impact does this unforeseen new drug have on the aggregate expenditure of the hospital. 
Due to unavailability of information about the new drugs introduced in a year in the Portuguese 
market, the aggregate expenditure (consumption) of medicines at the hospital level has been used, 
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which constitutes to be the dependent variable. Therefore the model tends to characterize the 
volatility in the aggregate expenditure of medicines at the hospital level. 
As mentioned above that each month the number of hospitals that report to Infarmed is different 
which eventually reflects a different percentage of expenditure by hospitals of NHS. So, in order to 
make the data consistent, the values of the aggregate expenditure on medicines has been made 
homogenous by dividing it by the % of consumption of hospitals of NHS to obtain a value of what 
would have the aggregate expenditure on medicines if all the hospitals under the NHS reported to 
Infarmed each month. Figure 4 plots the monthly evolution of the homogenous aggregate 
consumption of medicines at the hospital level for the years 2007 – 2011. 
 
Figure 4: Monthly evolution of aggregate consumption of medicine at hospital level 
 
As with many time series there is a common tendency of growing over time, the series graphed 
above also displays an upward trend (depicted as the Log (Medicine Consumption), which reflects 
that the consumption of medicines at the hospital level has increased over time. 
3.2.1.2 Explanatory Variable 
Time - T 
By adding a time trend to the regression we can avoid a spurious regression problem, which can be 
defined as a phenomenon of finding a relationship between two or more trending variables simply 
because each is growing over time. Therefore, in order to capture the unobserved factors that may 
systematically be growing or shrinking over time, the time trend has been included to de-trend the 
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model. In STATA, the variable time assumes values between 564 and 583; where 564 is a number 




Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
T 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 
Date 
(2008) 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
T 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 
Date 
(2009) 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
T 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 
Date 
(2010) 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
T 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 
Date 
(2011) 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
T 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 
Table 5: Values assumed by variable T in the regression 
 
Time before July, 2008 – TB 
As can be seen from the figure 4 above, the trend up till some period of time is curved and after that 
period of time, the trend becomes linear. In order to capture the effect of the curved trend, an 
additional linear trend has been used. This additional trend is multiplied with a dummy which 
assumes the value of 1 before the critical point and value of 0 after that critical point. After finding 
the coefficients of the time on the monthly, July, 2008 has been used as the critical point. 
Monthly Dummies –  
The monthly time series observed above exhibits seasonality. Therefore to account for seasonality in 
the aggregate expenditure on medicines in the hospitals – the dependent variable, a set of seasonal 
dummy variables has been included for de-seasonalizing the data. June has been used as the base 
month for two purposes: Firstly, it is the median month and secondly, because the average 
expenditure on medicines in hospitals in the month of June is close to the overall total average 




Month Mean St Dev Min Max 
Jan 18.18336 .0048063 18.08154 18.27133 
Feb 18.13078 .0032049 18.07865 18.21983 
Mar 18.22638 .0089808 18.1125 18.32138 
Apr 18.17327 .0050671 18.05496 18.22858 
May 18.19315 .0043236 18.13833 18.29288 
Jun 18.16508 .003856 18.09086 18.23717 
Jul 18.22426 .0030329 18.13839 18.28533 
Aug 18.15107 .0052271 18.09369 18.24181 
Sept 18.19099 .0083465 18.04279 18.26093 
Oct 18.2272 .005099 18.19293 18.24767 
Nov 18.21581 .0044886 18.11739 18.27693 
Dec 18.18782 .0044886 18.07285 18.23573 
Total 18.1891 .0047411 18.04279 18.32138 
Table 6: Summary Statistics of aggregate consumption of medicines in hospitals by month 
Therefore by including time trends and the seasonal dummies in the regression model, the 
regression uses both de-trended and de-seasonalized series.  
Lagged Variable -   
As one of the objectives of the work is to forecast the values of aggregate consumption of medicines 
in hospitals, the lag of the dependent variable has been used which allows varying amounts of 
recent history to be brought into the forecast. Lagging of the dependent variable was necessary in 
order for the regression model to be able to predict the future i.e., to predict what will happen in 
period t based on knowledge of what happened up to period t-1. 




3.2.1.3 The Model 
An ordinary least square (OLS) regression has been chosen to estimate a model that allows 
predicting and computing forecast of the aggregate consumption of medicines at the hospital level 
based on quantified historical data. 
The model, which is estimated using an OLS, can be summarized as: 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
AggrConsp 60 18.1891 0.068856 18.04279 18.32138 
Time 60 593.5 17.46425 564 623 
TB 60 .3 .4621248 0 1 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics of the model 
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Due to the unavailability of data from the PPP hospitals, the model has been estimated 
econometrically using historical data of the public hospitals under the NHS. Through the estimates of 
the model and computation of the forecasts, a VaR has been calculated at 95% confidence. An 
estimate of the regression of the logarithm of the aggregate consumption of medicines at the 
hospital level has been depicted in table 8.  
AggrConsp Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
Time 0.0030123 0.0005799 5.19 0.000 0.001844 0.004181 
TB -0.0402216 0.0172853 -2.33 0.025 -0.07506 -0.00539 
AggrConsplag1 -0.2708204 0.1444454 -1.87 0.067 -0.56193 0.02029 
Jan 0.0311026 0.0242162 1.28 0.206 -0.0177 0.079907 
Feb -0.0249035 0.0226469 -1.1 0.277 -0.07055 0.020738 
Mar 0.0534402 0.0239539 2.23 0.031 0.005164 0.101716 
Apr 0.0232125 0.0232643 1 0.324 -0.02367 0.070099 
May 0.0256943 0.0227189 1.13 0.264 -0.02009 0.071481 
Jul 0.0405157 0.0233646 1.73 0.090 -0.00657 0.087604 
Aug -0.0196588 -0.0229358 -0.86 0.396 -0.06588 0.026565 
Sept -0.0025679 -0.024067 -0.11 0.916 -0.05107 0.045936 
Oct 0.0414407 0.0228352 1.81 0.076 -0.00458 0.087462 
Nov 0.0368456 0.0227933 1.62 0.113 -0.00909 0.082782 
Dec 0.002759 0.0226759 0.12 0.904 -0.04294 0.048459 
Cons 21.32198 2.424006 8.8 0-000 16.43672 26.20724 
Table 8: Estimates of the regression model 
The model is globally significant with a p-value of 0, RMSE of 0.357, an R-square of 79.08% and an 
adjusted R-square of 72.42%.  
 
3.2.1.4 Tests    
In order to use OLS standard errors, t statistics and F statistics, we need to prove that the OLS 
coefficients are consistent and unbiased. For this, the model defined above has to comply with all 
the time series assumptions which are as follows: 
 Assumption 1 – The time series process follows a model that is linear in parameters. 
 Assumption 2 - No perfect collinearity among independent variables. 
 Assumption 3 - Zero conditional mean which implies that the error at time t, is uncorrelated 
with each explanatory variable in time period. 
 Assumption 4 – The variance of the error conditional on the independent variables cannot 
depend on the independent variables and the variance of the error is constant over time. To 
check for heteroskedasticity the following tests have been performed: 
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Breusch-Pagan test chi2(1) = 0.00 Prob > chi2 = 0.9698 
F-statistic – F-test F(1.46) = 0.00 Prob > F = 0.9617 
N*  version - iid chi2(1) = 0.00 Prob > chi2 = 0.9608 
Table 9: Results of Heteroskedasticity 
As can be seen from table 9, the p-value of each test is higher than a 5% significance level, 
which leads to the non-rejection of the null hypothesis of the errors being homoskedastic. 
This implies that the unobserved variables (errors) of the model have a constant variance 
over time. The estimate of the variance is depicted in table 10. 
Sum of Squared Residuals .056067619 
Estimates Variance of Errors 0.0012742 
Table 10: Variance of the error 
 Assumption 5 – The errors in two different periods when conditional on the independent 
variables are uncorrelated. If they are not then the errors are said to suffer from serial 
correlation. 
Breusch-Godfrey test (p=12) chi2 = 20.982 Prob > chi2  = 0.0506 
Durbin-H test (p=12) chi2 = 17.661   Prob > chi2  = 0.1264 
Table 11: Results of Auto-correlation 
From table 11 we see that the null hypothesis of the errors in different periods being serially 
correlated is rejected as the p-value for both the tests is higher than a 5% significance level. 
This implies that the unobserved variables (errors) of the model are not serially correlated. 
As the model complies with the above assumptions, the estimates from the OLS regression have 
been used for further analysis. 
 Assumption 6 – The error is independent of the independent variables and is normally 
distributed.  Performing the Jarque-Bera Test, it was also found that the errors follow a 
normal distribution. The result of which has been depicted in table 12 below. As statistic 
does not belong to the critical region of >5.99, there is no reason to reject the null 
hypothesis of the errors following a normal distribution. 
N Skew Kurt J.B Test 
59 -0.457817275 0.773403878 3.531494626 





3.3 Volatility Analysis 
The initial approach to calculate the variance for sample period was to use ARCH/GARCH model. 
Performing the arch test it was found that the model does not suffer from arch effects. This is 
depicted in table 13. 
Arch lm test (p=12) chi2 =   12.927 Prob > chi2  = 0.3743 
Table 13: Test for Arch effects 
Provided that arch effects do not exist, a more traditional approach has been adopted to compute 
the volatility through the method of moving volatility. The volatility is tabulated through a moving 
average of expanding window. It can be explained by computing the variance in which the first 
observation remains fixed and thereon a new observation is added, thereby expanding the window. 
The formula is as follows: 
 
 
Where,  = Estimated standard deviation of the window length; 
 = According to this model is the aggregate consumption of medicines;  
 = Average of aggregate consumption of medicines of that window length; and 
  = First observation 
Therefore, by using the above formula, the variance has been computed for the sample period. 
VaR is defined as the minimum loss that could occur at a given confidnce level over a specific period. 
It therefore, specifies the risk faced in this case by the hospitals. Considering a 95% confidence level 
(with uni-lateral band), and the standard deviation estimate, it can be said that 5% of the times, the 
hospitals loses within the next month, at least the value of VaR. 
VaR has thereby been calculated by computing the standard deviation from the above variances and 
then multiplying it by a value of 1.644854 which is the inverse of the standard normal cumulative 







The method of OLS chooses the estimates to minimize the sum of squared residuals. From table 5, 
which depicts the estimates of the regression model and considering a significance level of 5%, it can 
be seen that the independent variables time, TB (time before June, 2008) and the dummy of the 
month of March are statistically significant as their p-values are lower than 5%. Although, the 
variable with a one month lag is not significant at 5% significance level,  it is significant at 10%. As 
aforementioned, It was necessary to include the lagged term in order to compute the forecast of the 
aggregate consumption of medicines in the hospital sector. The statistical significance of each of the 
independent variables can be found in the following table 14. 
Time TB AggrConsplag1 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
*** ** * - - ** - - * - - * - - 
Table 14: Statistical Significance of the independent variables 
 (*) – statistically significant at 10%, (**) – statistically significant at 5%, (***) – statistically significant at 1%  
Interpretation of the coefficients: 
Time - It is estimated that in average, the aggregate consumption of medicines in the hospital sector 
increases 0.301% per month after removing seasonality.  
Seasonal dummies - It is estimated that in average, the aggregate consumption of medicines in the 
hospital sector, in relation to June, increases 3.11%, 5.34%, 2.32%, 2.57%, 4.05%, 4.14%, 3.68% and 
0.28% in the months of January, March, April, May, July, October, November and December 
respectively after removing the trend. 
Seasonal dummies - It is estimated that in average, the aggregate consumption of medicines in the 
hospital sector, in relation to June, decreases 2.49%, 1.97% and 0.26% in February, August and 
September respectively after removing the trend. 
TB - It is estimated that in average, the aggregate consumption of medicines in the hospital sector 
increases 4.02% per month after removing seasonality and the trend. 
AggrConsp_lag1 – It is estimated that in average, the aggregate consumption of medicines in the 
hospital sector in the previous month increases by 1%, the aggregate consumption of medicines in 
the hospital sector in the current month falls by .2708%.  
It is a fact that the consumption of medicines exhibits seasonality. The months of March, July and to 
some extent the month of October have always been statiscally significant and have a positive 
coefficient, whereas the months of February and August, although usually never statiscally 
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significant and always a negative coefficient implying that the consumption of medicines in those 
month decreases. Usually August has low consumption, and that is partially made up in the months 
July and/or September. As July is a month of holidays, people are usually more available to visit the 
hospitals for all sorts of tests. February is a smaller month, so the consumption reduces In this 
month but is compensated later in the March at the beginning of spring. 
From Table 10, we saw that the errors do not exhibit ARCH effects, this imples that the errors are 
not serially correlated and that there no shocks or innovations in the errors. This is also proved by 
the autocorrelation tests performed above. Although the errors have a constant variance, it does not 
imply that there is no risk. It just implies that is there may be significantly lower risk. And this can be 
noted in the Figure 2 below. On computing the volatility of the residuals along time through the 
method of expanding window, it was found that the errors vary between 0.000868 and 0.001046. 
VaR varies between 4.8467% and 5.3186%, for the public hospitals under NHS in this analysis. To 
what extent does the VaR reach for the public private partnership is difficult to assume as no of the 
hospitals under the PPP’s reported to Infarmed during the period 2007 – 2011. Provided the fact 
that the contracts once signed by hospitals under PPP’s for the management of the health services, 
any new introduction of drug in the market would imply an increased costs for the hospitals and 
thus higher and a more volatile risk. But this can only be tested once the data has been made 
available for. The figure 5 below plots the VaR and the volatility of the residuals (unobserved 
variables). 
 




The relatively low level of risk involved in the public hospitals under NHS could be due to the fact of 
the change in the fiscal policy associated with the health sector that was marked in 2006, 2007 & 
2011 initially mentioned. The main priority of the health ministry was the cost containment in the 
public sector of health care, mainly In drugs, be it for outpatient or in hospital. The other objective 
being, promoting the use of generics, liberalising the sale of drugs not subject to doctors prescription 
and motivating fall in prices. Reduction of prices acts directly on the price level as a way to induce a 
shift of demand towards a greater consumption of generic drugs (Pedro, Luis 2011). Therefore, to a 
greater extent, the fiscal policy of cost containment explains the reason why the there has not been 
a significant increase in the expenditure on medicines. Figure 6 below plots the actual values from 
the period between 2007-2011 of the aggregate cosumption of medicines at the level hospital level 
against the predicted values from the estimates of the coefficients of the regression model for the 
sample period. The forecasted value of the aggregate consumption of medicines for the years 2012-
2015 is also plotted which is followed by the plot of the actual values. 
 
Figure 6: Plot of the actual & forecast vs. predicted values of consumption of medicines 
From the figure 4 initially presented and from figure 6 presented above, we find that the hospital 
market has grown at a steady pace. According to the information available on Infarmed about the 
consumption drugs for cancer & HIV/AIDS, it can be seen that those two areas of activity represent 
together about 40% of the aggregate cost of the consumption of medicines in the hospital sector. 
Hence to some extent the growth in the market of medicines of hospitals could be due the cost 





Figure 7: % expenditure in medicines in the hospitals per area of activity 
From the above figure 7, we can see that oncology & infections (which includes HIV/AIDS) constitute 
about 40% of the aggregate expenditure of medicines at the hospital level. The main barrier to the 
growth of the expenditure of medicines at the hospital level, is its economic evaluation as its prior 
requirement before the usage of a usually expensive new medicine.   
 Although the original regression model includes a lag of one month for the purpose of predicting 
the aggregate consumption of medicines at the hospital level, two other models have also been 
tested, one of which includes a three month lag (season lag)  whereas the other model includes a 12 
month lag (yearly lag) for the purpose of checking the predictive power of the dependent variable 
using all other independent variables as before. 









The results from 3 and 12 month lag model are depicted in the table 15: 
AggrConsp Coefficient      P>t AggrConsp Coefficient      P>t 
 time 0.0011701 0.066  Time 0.0019796 0.015 
TB -0.0257016 0.133 TB -0.0287977 0.173 
AggrConspLag3 0.4032552 0.01 AggrConspLag12 0.0878286 0.602 
Jan 0.038593 0.108 Jan 0.0338152 0.211 
Feb -0.0186097 0.441 Feb -0.0285224 0.285 
Mar 0.0911832 0.001 Mar 0.0622484 0.035 
Apr 0.0278766 0.227 Apr 0.0218556 0.409 
May 0.0677839 0.013 May 0.0215219 0.417 
Jul 0.0742772 0.003 Jul 0.0466978 0.114 
Aug -0.0080959 0.728 Aug -0.031412 0.245 
Sept 0.0419755 0.098 Sept 0.0285751 0.289 
Oct 0.0531518 0.022 Oct 0.0300198 0.301 
Nov 0.0701066 0.011 Nov 0.0346442 0.21 
Dec 0.0248464 0.301 Dec 0.0109622 0.68 
Cons 10.13159 0 Cons 15.41121 0 
Table 15: Estimates of regression model with 3m & 12m lag 
The 3month & 12month lag model are globally significant with a p-value of 0 each, RMSE of .03486 
and .03656 respectively, an R-square of 79.87% and 71.61% respectively and an adjusted R-square of 
73.16% and 59.56% respectively. The statistical significance of each of the independent variables for 
both the models is depicted in the following table 16. 
Time TB AggrConsplag3 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
** - *** - - *** - ** *** - * ** ** - 
Time TB AggrConsplag12 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
** - - - - ** - - - - - - - - 
Table 16: Statistical Significance of the independent variables with 3m & 12m lag 
 (*) – statistically significant at 10%, (**) – statistically significant at 5%, (***) – statistically significant at 1%  
On comparing the original monthly model (1 month lag), season and yearly model, it can be noted 
that the season model has a higher predictive power as 79.87% of the total variation in the 
aggregate consumption of mdecines at the hospital level is explained by the predictive power of all 
the independent (explanatory) variables, additionally the mean squared error of the season model is 
the lowest when compared with the monthly and the yearly model. 
Interpretation of the coefficients of the season and yearly model: 
Time - It is estimated that in average, the aggregate consumption of medicines in the hospital sector 
increases 0.117% & 0.19796% per month respectively after removing seasonality.  
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Seasonal dummies - It is estimated that in average, the aggregate consumption of medicines in the 
hospital sector, in relation to June, increases 3.85% & 3.38%, 2.79% & 2.19%, 6.78% & 2.15%, 7.42% 
& 4.67%, 4.20% & 2.86%, 5.32% & 3%, 7.01% & 3.46%, 2.48% & 1.10% respectively in the months of 
January, March, April, May, July, September, October, November and December respectively after 
removing the trend. 
Seasonal dummies - It is estimated that in average, the aggregate consumption of medicines in the 
hospital sector, in relation to June, decreases 1.86% & 3.85%, 0.81% & 3.14% respectively in 
February and August respectively after removing the trend. 
TB - It is estimated that in average, the aggregate consumption of medicines in the hospital sector 
decreases 2.57 % & 2.88% respectively after removing seasonality and the trend. 
AggrConsplag3 – It is estimated that in average, when the aggregate consumption of medicines in 
the hospital sector increases by 1% three months before, the aggregate consumption of medicines in 
the hospital sector in the current month increases by .40325%.  
AggrConsplag12 – It is estimated that in average, when the aggregate consumption of medicines in 
the hospital sector increases by 1% a year ago, the aggregate consumption of medicines in the 
hospital sector in the current month increases by .08783%.  
The following figure 8 plots the actual values of the aggregate consumption of medicines at the 
hospital level for the sample period of 2007-2011 followed by the forecasted values for 2012-2015 
against the predicted values of the sample period. 









Figure 3a:  
Figure 8: Plot of the actual & forecast vs. predicted values of consumption of medicines 
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The volatility and VaR of the aggregate consumption of medicines at the hospital level for season lag 
and yearly lag has been computed in the same way as that of the monthly lag, i.e. using the moving 
average - expanding window volatility method. On computing the volatility in the residuals of the 
regression model for the season and yearly lag it was found that the residuals vary between 
0.000906337 - 0.001190102 and 0.000938677 - 0.001190102 respectively. The VaR varies between 
4.9519% - 5.6744% and 4.9188% - 5.9583% respectively. The plot of the variance in residuals and 
VaR of the regression model with season lag and yearly lag is depicted below in figure 9. 










Figure 9: Plot of Variance of errors & VaR 
From the figures above, it can be concluded that although not very high but the variance of the 
errors and the VaR is slightly higher under the yearly lag when compared to the monthly and season 
lag for the public hospitals under NHS. Therfore, the minimum loss that could occur at a given 
confidence level over a specific period, considering a 95% confidence level (with uni-lateral band), 
and the standard deviation estimate, it can be said that 5% of the times, the hospitals loses within 
the next month, next three months or within the next year, at least 5.0409%, 5.0498% & 4.9785% 
respectively in January 2012. 
In order to compute the veracity of the OLS coefficients, the same econometric tests used for the 
monthly lag were performed for the season lag and yearly lag. Performing those tests it was found 
that the errors in two different periods when conditional on the independent variables are 





Figure 10 below depicts the predicted values of the monthly lag, season lag and yearly lag of the 
aggregate consumption of medicines at the hospital level for the sample period of 2007-2011. 
 
Figure 10: Predicted values of the 3 regression models 
Figure 11 below depicts the forecasted values of the monthly lag, season lag and yearly lag of the 
aggregate consumption of medicines at the hospital level for period of 2012-2015. 
 





The aim of this work is to forecast the aggregate expenditure on medicines at the hospital level 
under the National Health Service (NHS) and thereby, compute the risk (expenditure on medicine 
consumption to the hospital) through a Value at Risk (VaR) analysis. PPP’s in the health sector in 
Portugal are very recent. This was shown in the table 1 where Hospital of Cascais, Braga and Loures 
started in 2010, 2011 and 2012 respectively. Hospital of Vila Franca de Xira is expected to start in 
2013. This implies that no data about the drugs consumption, especifically on Infarmed, is available 
publicly about the aforementioned PPP’s hospital. Therefore, the data used along the work for the 
purpose of analysis includes data only of the public hospitals under the NHS that reported to 
Infarmed that month. So far no specific model for analysis of risk of the hospitals under the PPP’s has 
been developed. 
As one of the purposes of the work is to forecast the expenditure of drugs consumption in the 
hospital sector, the data about the aggregate drugs consumption in the public hospitals under the 
NHS from Infarmed has been used. The analysis does not include any data about the PPP’s hospitals 
as Infarmed does not produce it yet in their reports. As the data is available on a monthly basis, the 
independent variables include seasonal dummies, two linear time trends and a lagged variable of the 
dependent variable which is the aggregate drugs consumption in the public hospitals. Using the 
aforementioned variables, three models have been used. The only difference among the three 
models is that of the lagged variable. The first model includes a monthly lag of the dependent 
variable, the second model includes a season lag (3 month lag) and the third model includes a yearly 
lag (12 month lag). From each of the models the residuals have been used in order to compute the 
VaR. The variance of the residuals has been computed using the moving average – expanding 
window method as the residuals do not portray arch effects. So a more traditional approach has 
been applied. Using the standard deviation from the variance calculated, the VaR has been 
computed by multiplying the standard deviation by a confidence level of 95%.  
From the results obatined about the volatility and VaR calculated using the information available 
about the public hospitals, it may be seen that the VaR is not that high. As interpreted in the results, 
the minimum loss that could occur at a given confidence level over a specific period, considering a 
95% confidence level, and the standard deviation estimate, it can be said that 5% of the times, the 
hospitals loses within the next month, next three months or within the next year, at least 5.0409%, 
5.0498% & 4.9785% respectively in January 2012. From figures 6 & 8, it may be seen that the 
aggregate drugs consumption in the hospital sector seems to be increasing but at a steady pace 
without much volaitility. There could be two possible reasons for this: firstly, the cost containment 
32 
 
of the expenditure in drugs due to the fiscal policy changes in 2006, 2007 and 2011 and secondly, 
due to the promotion of the use of generics. Within the European countries, Portugal is the country 
in which the new medicines are introduced extremely late, and where less products are introduced. 
Only in gross terms, the policy of low prices of medicines in Portugal has resulted in making available 
in the national market less new products than other countries of the European Union. And of those 
that are introduced, have a significant time delay (Pedro, Luis 2011). It is also noted that drugs 
related to oncology and infections are usually expensive and constiute about 40% of weight in the 
aggregate consumption of the drugs at the hospital level. 
The conclusion drawn in general about the hospitals under PPP’s, is that the risk is very difficult to 
manage. From the critics identified initially in the work, of the 1st wave hospitals under PPP model it 
can also be learnt that the government did not learn from experience of other countries. The 
decision of changing the PPP/health model from 1st to 2nd wave is an ideological issue. The risk 
involved in the provision of clinical services by the private concessionaire is an important risk. It 
creates a strong financial impact where pricing plays a pivot role. Just like the U.K PPP/health model, 
PSC in Portugal should include the risk involved in the provision of the clinical services in their 
sphere. Negotiations of contracts of the hospitals under PPP’s in Portugal are also considered as an 
important factor of risk. All the clauses need to be very well defined and indentified in the contracts 
to avoid potential conflicts and potential losses. Improper negotiations of contract may affect the 
faster access to new or improved drugs to people of the catchment area of the hospitals, it may be 
possible that the government may be paying more or the private concessionaire’s have lower 
profits, all this leading to potential losses. 
The main drawback of the work was the unavailability of data related to the 1st wave hospitals under 
the PPP due to which the way these hospitals mitigate the unforeseen technological risk is a little 
amibigous. For future work, once the data related to hospitals under PPP’s are made available, the 
future impact of the 2012 price cuts of drugs could be measured. The extent to which the cost 
containment policy affects the PPP’s and the rate with which new drugs are introduced in the 








 (Broadbent, Gill, Laughlin, 2008) Identifying and controlling risk: The problem of uncertainty in 
the private finance initiative in the UK’s National Health Service 
 (DGTF, 2008) Direcção-Geral do Tesouro e Finanças. Relatório Sobre Parcerias Público-Privadas e 
Concessões  
 (DGTF, 2009) Direcção-Geral do Tesouro e Finanças. Relatório Sobre Parcerias Público-Privadas e 
Concessões  
 (DGTF, 2010) Direcção-Geral do Tesouro e Finanças. Relatório Sobre Parcerias Público-Privadas e 
Concessões  
 (DGTF, 2011) Direcção-Geral do Tesouro e Finanças. Relatório Sobre Parcerias Público-Privadas e 
Concessões  
 (Froud, Shaoul, 2001) Appraising and Evaluating PPP for NHS Hospitals 
 (Gatti, Rigamonti, Saita, Senati 2007) Measuring Value-at-Risk in Project Finance Transactions  
 (Grimsey, Lewis 2004). The Worldwide Revolution in Infrastructure Provision and Project Finance. 
 Guidelines for the economic evaluation of health technologies: Canada [3rd Edition]. Ottawa: 
Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health; 2006.  
 (HM Treasury, 2000) Public Private Partnerships: The Governments Approach. The Stationery 
Office,  London. 
 (NAO, 1999) National Audit Office. Examining the value for money of deals under the Private 
Finance Initiative (HC 739, 1998/99). London: HMSO; 1999. 
 (NAO, 2002) National Audit Office. The PPP contract for the redevelopment of West Middlesex 
University Hospital (HC 49, 2002–2003). London: HMSO; 2002. 
 (Nisar, 2007) Risk Management in Public–Private Partnership Contracts 
 (Palmer, Smith 2000). Incorporating option values into the economic evaluation of health care 
technologies  
 (Pedro, Luis 2011). 10 Anos de Política do Medicamento em Portugal. 
 (PNS, 2011-2016) Plano Nacional de Saúde POLÍTICA DO MEDICAMENTO, DISPOSITIVOS 
MÉDICOS E AVALIAÇÃO DE TECNOLOGIAS EM SAÚDE, November 2010  
 (Savvides, 1994) Risk Analysis in Investment Appraisal  
 (Tribunal de Contas, 2009): Auditoria ao Programa de Parcerias Público Privadas da Saúde - 
Primeira  vaga de Hospitais, Relatório n.º 15/2009 AUDIT 
 (World Bank, 2007) Sustainable Development Department in East Asia and Pacific. Public Private 
Partnership Units: Lessons for Their Design and Use in Infrastructure. The World Bank and 
Public- Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF).  
